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Abstract  
 
Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude 
are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend 
to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, 
our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected 
but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the 
incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in 
further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political 
budget cycles. 
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1. Introduction
Whether elected leaders use their incumbency advantage to distort policy-making to serve
their own interests is a central concern in political economics. In particular, leaders may adopt
strategic-timing decisions in a way that help them to hold office. Since Nordhaus (1975), a
large -and still increasing- number of studies have scrutinized if and how leaders behave when
elections get closer. Despite significant heterogeneity, many studies have shown that incumbents
“try to make the year before an election a“happy one” in order to be re-elected”consistently with
Paldam (1979)’s expectations. In the present paper we concentrate on fiscal tools’ manipulation
as most of the political cycles literature has progressively turned to (Shi and Svensson, 2003).
Since cycles are not different from shocks affecting budget, they are likely to hurt the economy.
Smoothing the policy-making over the representatives’ terms should offer more economic stability
and benefit the broader interest. Furthermore, cycles reflect imperfections of institutions and
democracy. For these reasons, it is critical to better understand the patterns and mechanisms of
electorally-driven manipulation of public accounts. We believe this paper to contribute to this
aim and eventually helping to build better institutions fitting the populations’ will.
Considering the substantial size of the so-called political budget cycles literature (PbC), re-
searchers have regularly offered some literature reviews (Shi and Svensson, 2003; Eslava, 2011;
de Haan and Klomp, 2013).1 These reviews provide updated overviews and try to draw general
conclusions from the various and fragmented pieces of work they put together. They consti-
tute significant milestones of the research on the area, help to synthesize it and finally offer
or suggest further developments for scientists. However, literature reviews only provide partial
panoramas of the existing literature, that are likely to be biased and distorted towards the au-
thors’ ideological positions (Stanley, 2001). Studies not conform to the authors’ opinion may be
“unintentionally” sidelined or purely disregarded. A second limit of literature reviews resulting
of the latter point is the limited information-added they deliver. Literature reviews present and
organize researches that have been undertaken so far but do not reveal any additional insight.
In other words, classic narrative reviews are not able to resolve nor explain apparent divergences
among scholars’ empirical findings in a rigorous way.
In a attempt to offer a clearer picture of the vast amount of research on the PbC literature, we
provide a meta-regression analysis (MRA). MRA allows to go beyond the two limits of literature
1Similar reviews on political business cycles can be found in the literature (Drazen, 2001, among others).
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reviews above-mentioned. First, MRA relies on a systematic review of the existing literature. As
a consequence, it encompasses all studies produced to date on a specific issue. No matter how
well a study matches with the MRA author’s ideology, it receives the same weight than the other
studies collected. Second, MRA consists in carrying out a statistical analysis of the findings from
the collected studies. The regression-based analysis is expected to produce some new insights
on the issue in question, especially regarding heterogeneities and discrepancies observed in the
literature.
To implement the MRA, we first performed a broad and meticulous investigation of the
literature resulting in a selection of 58 papers. All these papers share specific inclusion charac-
teristics.2 In particular, they all provide a cross-country analysis of how the level of any budget
variable (component or total of public revenues, public expenditures, or fiscal surplus) is mod-
ified around elections.3 We then coded the 1,726 regressions extracted from our collection and
built our own original dataset summarizing the PbC literature empirical findings. This paper
presents the results of their statistical analysis. The MRA developed suggests that in average
leaders do manipulate budget before elections, though at a moderate rate. Our results also
reveal this rate is fairly exaggerated in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature and its
most debated issues. Section 3 describes the data we use for conducting the statistical analysis.
Section 4 provide preliminary evidences. Section 5 discusses our approach and the methodology.
Sections 6 to 9 presents the MRA results and the last section concludes.
2. Theoretical predictions
Meta-analysis offers a toolkit allowing in the best case to solve conflicting theoretical and/or
empirical findings on a specific research question.4 Concerning PbCs, the theory is rather unam-
biguous. It states that incumbents have an incentive to distort policy-making before elections in
order to please and incite voters to renew them at office (Rogoff, 1990).5 Empirical findings are
however more contrasting. In particular, the existence and magnitude of such predicted cycles
2see Section 3.1
3We refer indifferently to “budget” or “fiscal” variable. So we do for the terms “expenditure” and “spending”.
4One of the most famous example is on labor market effects of minimum-wage. Contrary to the neo-classic
predictions and conventional belief, meta-analyses reveal no significant negative association between minimum-
wage and employment (Card and Krueger, 1995; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009, for instance).
5We do not discuss here the underlying mechanisms, such as competency signaling process, trickery of short-
sighted voters or targeting of swing voter groups.
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vary according to factors, such as geography and especially institutional settings. In other words,
the manifestation of PbC is heterogeneous and conditional (Wittman et al., 2006). de Haan and
Klomp (2013) provide an excellent and updated review of conditioning variables examined in the
literature, such as the level of development, the quality of institutions, democracy characteristics,
and constitutional features.
In addition, some scholars question the effectiveness of such strategic manipulation. Several
country-specific studies show that incumbents that resort to PbC have a lower probability to be
re-elected. This phenomenon is evidenced by Peltzman (1992) for the United States, Brender
(2003) for Israe¨l, Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombian mayors, and Brender and Drazen
(2007) in a worldwide cross-country study.6 If voters punish rather than reward incumbents
running fiscal expansions before elections, then there should be no point to adopt such strategies.
Arvate et al. (2009) dissect this paradox and explain that strategic manipulation of fiscal
tools is more rewarding when voters are less sophisticated and informed. Unsurprisingly, PbC
are more pronounced in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006), less democratic regimes
(Gonzalez, 2002)7 and new democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005), where voters are usually
less informed and experienced, and where thus manipulation is expected to be more effective.
3. The meta-data
Basically a MRA breaks down in three stages. The first one is the collection of all the
relevant studies, that meet objective criteria we define. The second and most time-intensive step
is the coding of the estimates encompassed in theses studies resulting in a dataset ready to be
exploited. The third and last part is the statistical analysis of this dataset. We discuss the first
two steps in this section. Unlike standard empirical studies, MRA do not rely on primary data
such as GDP or household income. Rather we must deserve much care and effort to build our
own dataset, that is critical to ensure its quality and the consistence of our results.
6On the other hand, literature is far from unanimity on the detrimental effects of PbCs on incumbents chances
of reelection. Instead, Jones et al. (2012) and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), among others, find beneficial
effects for Argentinean governors and Brazilian mayors respectively.
7Gonzalez (2002) find higher PbC during the democratization process of Mexico, i.e. when Mexico had a weak
democratic framework.
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3.1. How did we select the studies?
The present meta-analysis relies on 1,331 estimates over 1,726 which have partial correlation
available, from 58 papers. This selection is the result of an extensive search and the adoption of
restrictive requirements.
First of all, we have implemented the search on the most comprehensive electronic search
engines, that is: EconLit, Science Direct, Ideas Repec, Springer, Wiley and Google Scholar, by
entering the keywords “political budget cycle”, “political business cycle”, and “electoral cycle”
in these bibliographic databases. As some relevant studies may have fallen through the cracks,
we undertook a manual complementary search. First, we looked for additional studies in the
references listed in the papers already selected. Second, we checked the publications and working
papers of the authors identified in the first round.8 Finally, we made our best to be as exhaustive
as possible. If any relevant study was to remain, we believe its omission is not likely to affect
our analysis since it relies on a substantial number of estimates and the potential “missed” ones
would be randomly omitted. We then refined our selection and only keep studies that are both
relevant and allow a consistent statistical analysis.
We only retain empirical cross-sectional papers written in English. A study with no regression-
based estimate is discarded de facto. This is the case of most theoretical papers and literature
reviews. In the empirical papers thus selected, we only retain original estimates9 that are based
on at least two countries. Single-country regressions dig often deeper in the theoretical mecha-
nisms supporting political cycles. In particular, the analysis of economic and political institutions
can be much finer, as it is often a real challenge to compare and collect data for comparable
variables for different countries. As a result, single-country regressions is likely to bring too much
specific estimates to our sample to be consistently compared with other estimates. Moreover,
this would have implied to dissect all studies whatever the language in which they are written
(Spanish, French, Chinese, Hindi, Russian, and so on). If quantifiable, the amount of work would
have been much more considerable than it has already been (and than all MRA require), and
risks related to omissions, such as hidden literature on a specific language, significantly higher.
8This manual search only revealed few supplementary papers that accredits the effectiveness of the electronic
round of the selection.
9We do not keep estimates reported or replicated from another source. Multiple-counting of the same regression
would artificially inflate its weight, that is, it would bias our results. Actually we did collect estimates reported
multiple times. Such cases are scarce, and unsurprisingly do not affect our results. For a matter of relevance, we
only present results after having removed multiple-counting.
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This methodological choice limits our sample of estimates, which is not a major concern in our
case since we rely on 1,726 estimates. To sum up, we believe the potential benefits of incorpo-
rating country-specific estimates in our analysis not worth the risks of omission and biases, and
the costs in terms of time that it incurs.
As most of the economic science is released in English, we are not likely to omit much
relevant studies. For similar reason we only retain estimates from scientific paper-formatted
study, whether published or not. We thus omit estimates from books, reports or even theses.
Indeed, the latter are less frequently numerically released and accessible, and often results from
books are also spread in papers, so that we eventually catch the relevant data they may contain.10
Additionally, we only consider papers which focus on how electoral periods affect the level
of either national deficits, revenues or expenditures, or a subdivision of one of these three broad
fiscal variables. Consequently, estimates whose the dependent variable is some sort of budget
composition change index are not considered.11 As the theory essentially predicts the behavior
of leaders before elections and not after, almost all regressions found in the literature focus on
pre-electoral cycles. Due to scarcity of both theoretical and empirical research on post-electoral
patterns (de Haan and Klomp, 2013), we restrict our attention to estimates of fiscal manipulation
during the run-up to elections.
Finally, based on all these criteria of inclusion, we updated and limited our search to studies
released before 1st January 2015. On the 1,726 regressions coded, we remove estimates that do
not offer the minimal statistical information required by MRA, that is partial correlations and
standard errors or t-statistics. We finally end up with a sample of 1,331 estimates.
3.2. Measures of the dependent variable
As stated above, we only retain estimates having a fiscal output as dependent variable,
indifferently expressed in level, as a nominal value, as a fraction (of GDP most of the time), as
a variation or growth rate. We thus exclude regressions based on budget composition change
(Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2013, for instance). Therefore, we neither
consider cases where the dependent variable is a ratio of a sub-component of a budget variable
10A notable example is the Persson and Tabellini (2003b)’s book, whose the results may be found in companion
papers (Persson, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003a)
11This is typically the case of Brender and Drazen (2013)’s paper. The information delivered by such a study
is meaningful, but we are not able to put together level and composition change indices in a consistent way in our
analyses.
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on this budget variable. For instance, in some regressions, Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) use the
ratio “current (or capital) spending / total spending”. In these cases, we observe the variation
of the ratio but we are not able to know if this variation results from an electoral manipulation
on the numerator, the denominator, or both. As a consequence we cannot know how the level
of current (or capital) expenditures is affected by the closeness with elections. Similar cases of
composition-related regressions that finally did not enter our sample may be found in Chang
(2008), Vergne (2009), or Klomp and de Haan (2013a) among others. Some papers are using
cyclically adjusted measures (Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006; Stanova, 2009; Moura˜o, 2011, for
instance), but interestingly not any considered study use a discretionary measure of fiscal output,
with the exeption of Buti and Van Den Noord (2004).
The literature splits into three budget variables, even if numerous studies compare succes-
sively the effect of elections on the three of them. A first set of estimates we code focuses on
expenditure patterns. Most of them take the level of public expenditures divided by GDP (276
estimates on 1,331). However, we find seven other finer measures based on sub-components
of expenditures, namely current, capital, broad, local and final consumption expenditures. All
these five measures are generally expressed as a share of GDP. Exceptions are Potrafke (2010)
and Klomp and de Haan (2013a) that use per capita for health and agriculture expenditures
respectively. Voters are supposed to be more sensitive to current rather capital expenditures
as their effects are more tangible in the short-term. Therefore leaders should be more prompt
to increase current spending in pre-election period. According to the electoral system prevail-
ing, leaders may also privilege manipulating broad/welfare spending or finer/local expenditures
targeting specific groups such as swing voters as a strategic tool.
A second set of estimates assesses how leaders manipulate public revenues according to
electoral periods. Once again, the authors’ favorite variable is the aggregate of all public revenues
on GDP (196 estimates on 1,331). We include estimates using 13 other measures, that are sub-
components of overall revenues, and are adjusted to the GDP. These alternative variables are
essentially specific kind of taxes, that are likely to be more easily or effectively manipulated by
leaders. We do not intend to be exhaustive and provide overwhelming details on these measures
and the related studies here, but some descriptive statistics are summarized in Table A.11.
The third set contains estimates of how elections impact national budget surpluses, which
are obtained by subtracting public expenditures to public revenues. Numbers of studies focus
on deficit rather than surplus. In this case, we multiply estimate values by -1 so that the last
9
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set contains only estimates of elections effect on budget surplus on GDP.
Finally, 914 estimates on 1,331 use one of the three main variables, that is nominal value of
either surplus, expenditures or revenues on GDP. The number of paper focusing on one category
of fiscal ouptut is relatively limited (except when considering fiscal surpluses, see Table 9 for
more details). Unsurprisingly, analysis from the whole sample (1,331 estimates) or a reduced
sample (914 estimates) yield similar results.
3.3. Measures of election variables
Authors have multiplied the ways of taking account of electoral manipulations. In particular,
their challenge is to catch electoral periods in an accurate and relevant manner (Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya, 2004). To do so they develop and compute electoral period variables of various
forms. The most common is a dummy taking one in years during which an election occurs,
or alternatively the year before it takes place.12 In order to better capture leaders’ behavior
during the year preceding elections, scholars have offered various adjustments to this “electoral
year dummy”, such as coding one pre-electoral years rather than electoral years when the ballot
occurs in the first x months of the civil year (Shi and Svensson, 2006), or by distinguishing
elections according to which period of the year they occur (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Mink
and de Haan, 2006).13 Another class of refinements is pioneered by Franzese Jr. (2000). With
this method the electoral variable is intended to measure how much of a given year may actually
been considered as pre-electoral. Considering an election taking place during the mth month of
year, the electoral variable equals
m
12
the electoral year, and
12−m
12
the year before. Alternative
measures derived from the generic presented presented here may be found in the literature. But
beyond the measure, scholars also question the nature of elections.
For instance, Klomp and de Haan (2013a,b,d) remove anticipated elections and focus ex-
plicitly on pre-determined ones in order to avoid endogeneity issues related to the timing of
elections. Another concern is which elections to consider. Usually two kinds of elections are
of national importance, namely legislative and executive ones. Facing the arbitrariness of the
choice, some authors such as Fata´s and Mihov (2003) do not distinguish and pay attention to
12Even though most authors are interested by pre-election periods, some studies focus on post-electoral years
and may use interest variable in the form of a binary variable equaling one in years following a civil year during
which a ballot has occured (Block, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003a; Alt and Lassen, 2006; Ebeke and O¨lc¸er,
2013, among others).
13Most of the time, these techniques are employed as robustness or sensitivity tests.
10
Études et Documents n° 33, CERDI, 2015
all elections, with the risk of a high frequency of elections and the lack of relevant focus. Other
papers focus on one given kind of elections considered by the authors as more meaningful for
all the countries of their sample (Hagen, 2007, for instance).14 Yet, according to the constitu-
tional design of countries, one kind or the other may exert greater forces on the policy-making
and thus may be more relevant to the issue of political cycles. A last group of authors chose
to use what is considered as the highest election according to the country (Shi and Svensson,
2006, for instance): legislative elections for parliamentary governments and executive elections
for presidential governments.
4. A first glance
Concerning the magnitude of the leaders’ manipulation, a chronological ordering of the mean
estimate from each paper of our collection provided in Figure 1 reveals a clear declining trend
in time. Earlier papers report stronger budget manipulation than newer studies. The decline is
strong since mean estimate is divided by more than two during the last 25 years. This result
may have two main sources, or combination of both. First, the budget manipulation may have
declined over time, and newer papers, using more recent data logically report weaker economic
effects. Second, researchers may have been less prone to inflate the magnitude of the effects
they report. In other words, we know the reported effects of pre-electoral budget manipulation
have declined over time, but we are not sure who deserves the credit. Does this translate more
trustworthiness of leaders or researchers? Before turning to a more rigorous statistical and
quantified analysis, graphical tools can still offer us additional information on these two insights.
Because they offer a first answer at the economic question raised at a glance, funnel graphs
have become very popular in MRA. In our framework, a funnel graph consists in plotting the
estimates of election effect on fiscal aggregates collected in the literature (horizontal axis) against
a measure of the precision of these estimates (vertical axis). Most of the time, precision is
measured by the inverse of the estimate standard errors (1/SE). In other words, funnel plots
provide an illustration of how the estimates are distributed. Most of the estimates lie at the
bottom of the graph. They are by definition not precise and they vary across a wide range of
estimate values. Moving to the top, the more precise, the more concentrated around a value
14Others adopt mixed strategies by retaining only presidential governments and focusing on executive elections
(Block, 2002; Hanusch and Vaaler, 2013), or parliamentary governments and consider legislative elections (Bayar
and Smeets, 2009).
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are the estimates. This value is supposed to reflect the “true” genuine effect of election on fiscal
manipulation. If the distribution is centered on zero, we should conclude that elections have no
effect on such manipulation. A second information we may infer from such graphs is potential
selection bias in the literature. In the absence of such a bias, points should be symmetrically
distributed around this “true” effect. Computed skewness suggest in Figure 5 selection bias
towards the direction where inclines the distribution.
For the funnel we design, partial correlations are preferred to regression coefficients that are
sensitive to measures and scales of election and fiscal variables. To ensure comparability across
the estimates, we convert the coefficients collected into partial correlations. We compute partial
correlations such as:
r =
t√
t+ df
(1)
where t is the t-statistic and df the degrees of freedom of each estimate collected. If the
sample size is almost always reported by authors, it is rarely the case for degrees of freedom.
Fortunately, partial correlation are weakly sensitive to imprecise degrees of freedom calculations
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012); this uncertainty is especially marginal as sample sizes in the
PbC literature state in hundreds even thousands of observations. This standardization removes
the economic meaning of effects but still informs on the magnitude and direction of associations
between election and fiscal manipulation and makes them quantitatively comparable. By way
of robustness, we also compute the widely used Fisher’s partial correlation transformations.15
Figure 2 reports the partial correlations on the right panel and Fisher’s partial correlations
on the left panel of the effect of election on public spending from the 535 regressions coded.
Consistently with the theory, the“true” value of the manipulation regarding public expenditures,
suggested by the top of the distribution is positive yet close to zero. Moreover, if most estimates
reveal a positive manipulation, this is partly explained by a clear skewed right distribution.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the funnel graph of correlations between elections and
public revenues (Figure 3). The distribution is not symmetrical and inclines to the left suggesting
a selection bias in favor of results reporting a reduction of public revenues in pre-electoral periods.
However, the “true” value of manipulation on this aggregate is here less unambiguously on the
left of the 0-line. This may translate a lesser ability of leaders to modify tax rates and/or a weak
15We apply the formula: z =
1
2
ln
1 + r
1− r . See Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) for a discussion.
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sensibility of voters regarding revenues cuts. Since leaders tend to increase spending and slightly
reduce revenues when elections get close, Figure 4 reveals a degradation of the budget surplus
preceding ballots. Selection bias appears once again distinctly. Figure 5 offer a global view on
leaders’ manipulation over fiscal tools. In this figure we recode the correlations of revenues and
surplus by multiplying them by -1, so that we can combine the three previous graphs into one
combined funnel graph in a consistent manner. In this graph, any positive correlation suggests
a strategic vote-catching manipulation of fiscal tools by leaders. In short, funnel graphs show us
that leaders manipulate budget before elections and that researchers manipulate their results in
order to make the leaders’ manipulation bigger.
Finally, we look at the distribution of the t-statistics of the estimates reported in the litera-
ture. Figure 6 show that t-statistics are concentrated around 2 (or -2) according to the expected
direction of the association between elections and budget components. That is, t-statistics are
concentrated around the standard threshold of statistical significance at 5%. It is then hard to
believe this concentration around this specific value that we found in the four panels of Figure 6
to be a pure coincidence. Rather, we suspect this reveals a tendency of researchers to select the
results they report, that is statistically significant effects. These first pieces of evidence suggest
that the PbC literature is made of both manipulation of political leaders and researchers. How-
ever a graphical analysis is not sufficient to state it with certainty. At this stage, we then turn
to a more rigorous statistical analysis that allow to dig deeper the findings, dissect the effects
and quantify them more precisely.
Figure 1: Average partial correlation (adjusted) per year
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Notes: We compute averaged partial correlation for each publication year of the 58 studies. Detailed figures are provided in Table A.12.
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Figure 2: Funnel plot of election-on-spending partial correlation (n = 535)
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Figure 3: Funnel plot of election-on-revenues partial correlation (n = 354)
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Figure 4: Funnel plot of election-on-fiscal surplus partial correlation (n = 442)
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Figure 5: Funnel plot of election-on-fiscal output partial correlation (n = 1, 331; skewness = 0.31)
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Figure 6: Distribution of t-statistics
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Notes: Upper-left quadrant: Distribution of t-statistics on spending. Upper-right quadrant: distribution of t-statistics on revenues.
Lower-left quadrant: Distribution of t-statistics on fiscal surplus. Lower-right quadrant: distribution of t-statistics on all output (inverse
t-student for revenues and fiscal surplus).
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5. MRA methodology
To obtain more rigorous insights from the dataset we built, we let the data speak by turning
to a standard model of simple meta-regression. Basically, it consists in regressing the partial
correlations between elections and budget variables on a constant and its standard errors:
rij = β0 + β1SEij + εij , (2)
where r and SE denote the ith computed partial correlation and standard error from study
j and ε are the residuals. Through the estimation of β1 and β0, such a model allows to test
respectively for funnel-asymmetry and precision-effect. Conventional statistic theory assumes
independence between the magnitude of estimated effects and its standard errors. Any signifi-
cant association, reflected by a β1 statistically different from 0, would reveal a tendency to favor
estimates with a certain t-statistic, likely exceeding the standard threshold of statistical signif-
icance.16 Such a tendency is acknowledged as publication selection. Its causes are numerous
and deeply anchored to academic incentives for scholars (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012), that
proceed to sampling and specification searching and eventually select results that best fit their
ideology or conventional belief and offer greater opportunities of publication. In the case of
PbCs, we suspect that authors may favor results reporting incumbents’ strategic behavior and
thus we expect some positive and significant association between the magnitude of manipulation
and its standard error, as suggested by the right-skewed funnel graph in Figure 5.17 If so, the
literature would be biased and the effect of elections on budget distortions overestimated.
Since equation (2) captures and thus controls for potential publication selection, its constant,
β0 reveals the genuine effect of elections if any. This effect is not anymore inflated or distorted
by researchers’ selection. Determining this genuine effect is a critical task of MRA as conflicting
results in a literature fail to do so. In our case, it should reveal if and how much leaders are
likely to manipulate fiscal tools to boost their reelection prospects. However, a simple meta-
regression may not be fully satisfactory. As reviewed by de Haan and Klomp (2013), scholars’
disagreement does not lie in the existence of PbCs anymore but rather in the conditions of its
16Card and Krueger (1995) show that the t-statistics of studies assessing the effect of minimum-wage on em-
ployment gravitate around 2, approximation of the statistical significance at the usual 5% confidence level.
17When strategic behavior is supposed to lead to a deterioration of an aggregate, such as budget balance or
public revenues, the funnel is likely to be left-skewed and β1 negative.
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existence and magnitude. To examine the conditional nature of PbCs inherent to all socio-
economic phenomenon, we then turn to multiple meta-regressions. We increase equation (2) by
adding a vector Z of k covariates:
rij = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkZki + β1SEij + εij , (3)
Additional covariates allow to assess how PbCs differ across countries and over time, and how
authors’ methodological choices affect them. The list of explanatory variables used in the study is
provided in Table B.13. We organize them in nine categories: measure of fiscal output; measure
of the election variable; adjustments on the election variable; methodology employed; sample
composition; model structure; decades and regions included; publication outlet and covariates
included.
6. Basic results
We estimate equation (2) and present results in Tables 1 and 2. This standard MRA regres-
sion is acknowledged as FAT-PET, that stands for Funnel-Asymmetry (β0) and Precision-Effect
(β1) tests. In Table 1, we combine all fiscal outputs to observe leaders’ manipulation in general.
Panel (i) reports the results on all observations available. In panel (ii) we exclude observations
dealing with subcomponents of revenues and spending. In other words we remove cases of what
the literature refers as “pork barrel” (Drazen and Eslava, 2006) to focus on manipulation of the
broad fiscal outputs.18 Finally, panels (iii) and (iv) excludes conditional PbC, captured with
interactive models or sub-sampling, from regressions. In the first three rows of each panel we
employ weighted least squares (WLS) using precision squared as the weight. Precision squared
is the inverse variance, which produces “optimal” weights in meta-analysis (Hedges and Olkin,
1985). By tackling heteroskedasticity issue, WLS are suitable to MRA and routinely employed
by researchers (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). WLS do not treat all observations equally
and assign more weight to estimates that are reported more precisely. We then replicate each
regression: by clustering on studies, by double clustering on studies and fiscal output, and finally
employ robust regression to control for the effects of potential outliers.19
18“Pork barrel” is often assimilated to targeted infrastructure projects, but it can also refers to pre-electoral
increase in some current expenditures, such as agriculutural subsidies.
19This last estimator is also acknowledged as the precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE) and is
shown to be the best option when a genuine effect exists beyond selection bias (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
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As the introduction of the variable “standard error” (SE) in the econometric model captures
potential selection bias, the constant (β0) reveals the genuine effect of how leaders manipulate
budget in the run-up period to elections. Table 1 shows that this coefficient ranges from 0.022 to
0.032. The association is rather limited, according to Cohen (1988), but strongly significant and
impels us to conclude that leaders do use budget tools to increase their popularity before elec-
tions, thus creating PbC. This strategy is not illegal per se but consists in fooling short-sighted
or non-informed voters in the short-run to serve leaders’ own self interest at the cost of a smooth
and more sustained policy benefiting the broad interest. Such a political strategy thus deviates
from the ideal of democracy, and leaders employing it are likely to act as discreetly as possible.
As corruption, for instance, manipulation of budget is typically a hidden phenomenon. Given
the very nature of such phenomenon, finding any evidence of it, even small in magnitude, is to be
considered carefully both for economic efficiency and institutional quality reasons. On the other
hand, the first column of 1 report the value of β1 and its associated standard error, that indicates
the strength of selection bias if any. This coefficient is strongly significant both statistically and
economically. Ranging from 0.619 to 0.796, it is considered as large effect considering either
Cohen (1988) (β1>0.50) or Doucouliagos (2011) (β1>0.33) guidelines. This suggests that results
reported by researchers in this literature are strongly inflated. The manipulation of results is
strong and widespread.
Finally, based on the heterogeneous existing estimations to date and once removed any
selection bias, it appears that on average there is still a small but statistically robust effect of
manipulation. This first result answers the debate around the existence of PbC, but is mute
when it turns to explain what are their favored sources.
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Table 1: Estimates of the FAT-PET MRA [Basic results]
Regression/s.e.
(1) FAT (2) PET
Funnel asymmetry Meta-average N
(i) All observations (Adjusted partial correlation)
Double publication removed
Robust s.e. 0.661*** (0.085) 0.024*** (0.003) 1,331
Clustered s.e. 0.661** (0.250) 0.024*** (0.007) 1,331
Double clustered s.e. 0.661*** (0.232) 0.024*** (0.007) 1,331
Robust regression 0.767*** (0.091) 0.025*** (0.003) 1,331
(ii) Excluding ”pork-barrel” (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.723*** (0.091) 0.022*** (0.003) 914
Clustered s.e. 0.723*** (0.229) 0.022*** (0.006) 914
Double clustered s.e. 0.723*** (0.259) 0.022*** (0.008) 914
Robust regression 0.779*** (0.094) 0.024*** (0.003) 914
(iii) Exluding interactions (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.666*** (0.089) 0.022*** (0.003) 1,037
Clustered s.e. 0.666*** (0.226) 0.022*** (0.005) 1,037
Double clustered s.e. 0.666*** (0.234) 0.022*** (0.008) 1,037
Robust regression 0.796*** (0.097) 0.024*** (0.004) 1,037
(iv) Exluding subsamples (Adjusted partial correlation)
Robust s.e. 0.619*** (0.157) 0.029*** (0.006) 583
Clustered s.e. 0.619 (0.448) 0.029** (0.013) 583
Double clustered s.e. 0.619* (0.350) 0.029** (0.012) 583
Robust regression 0.699*** (0.166) 0.032*** (0.006) 583
Notes: Panel (i) reports all observations. Panel (ii) excludes subcomponents of revenues and spending. Panel (iii) excludes interactive models.
Panel (iv) excludes subsamples. The first 4 rows of each panels uses the weighted least squares (WLS), with precision squared (inverse
variance) used as weights. Clustering on studies, or double clustering on studies and fiscal output. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Cohen (1988)’s guidelines: small= less than 0.10; medium> 0.30; large> 0.50. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Estimates of the FAT-PET MRA [By fiscal output]
Regression/s.e.
(1) FAT (2) PET
Funnel asymmetry Meta-average N
(i) Spending
Robust s.e. 0.776*** (0.133) 0.014*** (0.005) 535
Clustered s.e. 0.776* (0.401) 0.014 (0.011) 535
Double clustered s.e. 0.776** (0.352) 0.014 (0.010) 535
Robust regression 0.793*** (0.166) 0.016** (0.006) 535
(ii) Restrictive measure of spending
Robust s.e. 0.657*** (0.158) 0.013** (0.005) 276
Clustered s.e. 0.657 (0.448) 0.013 (0.013) 276
Robust regression 0.587*** (0.180) 0.016** (0.007) 276
(iii) Revenues
Robust s.e. -0.617*** (0.178) -0.021*** (0.007) 354
Clustered s.e. -0.617* (0.347) -0.021 (0.015) 354
Double clustered s.e. -0.617* (0.356) -0.021 (0.015) 354
Robust regression -0.692*** (0.157) -0.026*** (0.006) 354
(iv) Restrictive measure of revenues
Robust s.e. -0.883*** (0.166) -0.011 (0.007) 196
Clustered s.e. -0.883** (0.307) -0.011 (0.012) 196
Robust regression -0.792*** (0.121) -0.023*** (0.004) 196
(v) Fiscal surplus
Robust s.e. -0.704*** (0.136) -0.032*** (0.004) 442
Clustered s.e. -0.704* (0.414) -0.032*** (0.008) 442
Robust regression -0.985*** (0.139) -0.029*** (0.005) 442
Notes: See Table 1. The dependent variable is the non adjusted partial correlation between elections and fiscal output. Panel (i) reports
observations on spending. Panel (ii) excludes subcomponents of spending. Panel (iii) reports observations on revenues. Panel (iv) excludes
subcomponents of revenues. Panel (v) reports observations on fiscal surpluses. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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7. Where does the PbC come from?
Table 2 displays the FAT-PET results for each group of fiscal output selected as dependent
variable. We report results for a broad measure of spending encompassing all types of expen-
ditures (panel (i)), and a narrow measure of spending by excluding subcomponents of total
spending (panel (ii)). We apply the same logic to revenues in panels (iii) and (iv). Finally, panel
(v) reports results when fiscal surpluses are used to capture fiscal cycles. Again, the results
show strong evidence of publication selection bias towards the direction expected by the theory.
Confirming theoretical assumptions, the effect of elections is positive for spending and negative
for revenues and fiscal surpluses. Interestingly, we do not find strong evidence of pre-electoral
manipulation on revenues and spending (panel (i) to panel (iv)), but we do find a statistically
significant and robust manipulation on fiscal surplus. This may suggest heterogeneity in the
strategies employed by leaders. According to the political easiness and pay-off that leaders face,
they may favor to manipulate rather spending or revenues. In different contexts, leaders maxi-
mize their re-election prospects by adopting a spending-strategy or a revenue-strategy, or even
a mixed strategy by manipulating both aggregates. If the strategy choice is not clear because
context-dependent, what is clear is that the primary balance systematically deteriorates before
elections. The pre-electoral deficit rise translate the opportunism of leaders even if the tools it
relies on differ.20
To assess even more finely the behavior of leaders, we offer to go one step further and look
inside each box: expenditures and revenues. Table 3 reports the estimated effect of electoral
manipulation by disaggregating the different fiscal tools. Columns 1 and 2 present results when
revenues are used, and columns 3 and 4 when spending are used. In column 2 and 4 we use the
fixed effects multilevel (FEML) estimator that includes dummy variable for individual authors
to take into account unobserved heterogeneity among authors in the PbC literature, with less
bias than random weighted average (Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). In every
case, total revenues and total spending are used as reference categories. For each column we
estimate equation 3, by just adding the fiscal tools as covariates.
Few papers study the composition of fiscal manipulation at national level, relative to stud-
ies at municipality level. Regarding revenues, seminal contributions of Ashworth and Heyndels
(2002), Efthyvoulou (2012), Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), focus on OECD countries, while
20These results echo back the work of Barberia and Avelino (2011) on Latin America countries.
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Block (2002) and Ehrhart (2013) study manipulation of revenues composition in developing
countries. We split revenues into direct taxes (income taxes, payroll taxes, property taxes),
external taxes (international trade taxes), indirect taxes (value added tax (VAT), general sales
tax (GST)) and non-tax revenues (social security revenues, goods and services revenues, govern-
ment borrowing). The MRA results are unconclusive about the strategic use of specific revenues
category by political leaders during electoral race. So, as recalled by Alesina et al. (1989), po-
litical leaders may prefer avoiding tax reforms before election to keep social order away from
demonstrations and strikes.
Regarding manipulation of spending composition, some articles focus on the opposition be-
tween capital and current spending (Block, 2002; Schuknecht, 2000; Block et al., 2003; Vergne,
2009; Efthyvoulou, 2012; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Combes et al., 2015, among others),
while other papers distinguish local public good spending from broad public good spending
(Schuknecht, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2003a; Chang, 2008; Potrafke, 2010; Enkelmann and
Leibrecht, 2013; Klomp and de Haan, 2013a, among others). So, we adopt a similar method-
ology, by splitting capital spending from current spending and broad public goods from local
public goods. The MRA report clear spending shifts towards current spending and away from
capital spending. The findings are in accordance with Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) for OECD
countries and with Vergne (2009) for developing countries. They also suggest that leaders re-
duce expenditures where the benefits are not strong enough in the short-run and reallocate the
amount thus“saved” to expenditures categories that offer them a greater and immediate political
pay-off.
We here rediscover evidence of composition effects acknowledged by Vergne (2009) for in-
stance. Facing a budget constraint, leaders appear to make it softer in pre-electoral periods. As
the result, the primary balance deteriorates and we observe PbCs. But the elasticity of budget
constraint has its limits. One of these is that making the PbC too important or perceptible
is likely to be punished by voters (Brender and Drazen, 2007). A way of bypassing budget
constraint is then to manipulate the composition of public spending. Leaders appear thus to
manipulate both level and composition - at least the expenditure side - of budget. It offers
leaders two strategies they may use as complement or substitute according to their power extent
over the policy-making and the political reward they expect from each strategy.
This result reinforces the care we must deserve to the manipulation observed on the global
level of budget aggregates as it is only one way leaders may distort the policy-making of that
23
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policy instruments. In the last two columns of Table 3 we reestimate our model on regressions of
Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) and Brender and Drazen (2013) focused on total revenue compo-
sition and total spending composition, respectively. As the number of studies and observations
is extremely limited, we remain cautious on interpretation of results; notice however a 10% sig-
nificant positive shift in spending composition in pre-electoral period, whereas the reverse is true
for revenues, which is consistent with the idea of manipulating spending, instead of revenues,
before elections.
Finally, the MRA results find preferences on manipulation of broad public good spending in
pre-electoral period. Some broad public goods, such as welfare spending, have a large component
of current spending, while some local public goods are mainly constituted by infrastructure
spending.21 In addition, political leaders may prefer giving satisfaction for a whole sociological
voters’ category rather than geographically targeted voters, to ensure strong electoral basis before
elections, since we consider broad public good spending as a ”[...] type of expenditure that benefits
broad groups in the population and is difficult to target towards narrow geographic constituencies.”
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003a, p. 4). To summarize, national political leaders have incentives
to allocate the cost of investment in current spending and increase broad public good spending
before elections. It is not conflicting with findings in literature on higher capital spending
and local public goods in pre-electoral period at municipality level, where voters’ preferences are
much more targetable (Khemani, 2004; Eslava, 2005, for the case of Indian states and Colombian
municipalities, respectively). Also, favoring targeted groups such as swing voters may be less
easily detectable in the data.
21The dichotomy is no longer relevant with other examples, such as public agriculture spending, constituted
either by capital and current spending and considered as broad public goods in most developing countries and
local public goods in developed countries (de Haan and Klomp, 2013; Klomp and de Haan, 2013a).
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8. Country characteristics
In the literature, several authors argue that the existence of PbC depends on country char-
acteristics. The MRA allows us to explore which of these factors are really conditioning or
favoring the budget manipulation by political leaders. To do so we rely on the conditional fac-
tors censused by de Haan and Klomp (2013), namely economic development, quality and age of
democracy, and constitutional settings. More precisely, we augment the model given in equation
2 by including a dummy equal to one for estimates from regressions containing only observations
for which the conditional factor is present. For instance, the dummy “low-income countries”
takes the value one for estimates having been computed on sample of low-income countries only.
We present the results in Table 4.22
Even if the evidence in the literature is mixed, conventional thinking is that PbCs are more
likely to occur or to be stronger in less developed economies (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Streb
et al., 2009). The first two columns of Table 4 show that this view is not supported by meta
data. The coefficients associated to the dummies go in the expected direction but are virtually
null since they are not statistically significant. We do not detect any difference of the level of
manipulation between low- and high-income countries. Another debate in the literature concerns
of the effect of democracy on the occurrence of PbCs. Some authors such as Gonzalez (2002)
and Block et al. (2003) argue that the level of democracy is negatively correlated to the budget
manipulation, whereas others (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Klomp and de Haan, 2013b) consider
that it is rather the age of democracy that matters most. Then, examine both the effect of age
and level of democracy in columns 3 to 6. We see that the average effect of budget manipulation
given by the PET coefficient is actually mainly driven by the set of young democracies. Older
democracies exhibit significantly less strong effects. Actually the coefficient associated to the
“Established democracies” offsets the PET coefficient, suggesting that leaders facing experienced
voters are not likely to engage in pre-electoral budget distortions. On the other hand, it appears
that a high-level of democracy is associated with reduced PbCs. Even if the less distorting effects
are both statistically and economically more substantial in established democracies compared
to stronger democracies, we cannot conclude clearly which democracy characteristic dominates.
22We considering methodologies of the World Bank Atlas to capture economic development, Brender and Drazen
(2005) to capture age and level of democracy, but also Cheibub et al. (2010), Blume and Voigt (2011) and Bormann
and Golder (2013) for constitutional rules, when authors don’t use their own classification rules. Results are robust
when applying all previous methodologies for all papers.
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And the debate stays open. Quality and age of democracy often go together, that make their
respective effects difficult to disentangle. At this stage the most plausible interpretation is that
both matters. Even when voters are experienced, a degradation of the democracy level may
offer a leader a greater room to manipulation, and conversely. Additionally, we look how the
institutional settings result in a greater tendency of leaders to create pre-electoral budget cycles
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003b). The evidence on this question is rather limited and results
point in opposite direction (Streb et al., 2009; Klomp and de Haan, 2013b). In particular, we
assess if leaders have greater incentives to make PbCs in parliamentary relative to presidential
governments, and in majoritarian relative to proportional election-systems. Whether for the
form of government or the electoral rules, the last four columns of Table 4 show that in average
leaders do not behave differently regarding their level of budget manipulation according to the
constitutional design.23
Finally, level and age democracy appear to affect the level of PbCs. In particular, newer
and less strong democratic regimes are characterized by PbCs of greater magnitude. The MRA
additionally reveal that other factors discussed in the literature do not affect systematically
budget manipulation, so that cannot be qualified as PbC existence condition.
23A finer analysis of the manipulation of budget components (revenues vs expenditures for instance), as it had
been undertaken by Persson and Tabellini (2003a) might reveal different strategies according to the nature of
institutions whose the result is not detectable by just looking at the variation of the overall budget. However, due
to the lack of observations, we are not able to proceed to this narrower analysis at meta level.
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9. Sources of heterogeneities
So far, we reached to show two insights. First that PbCs do exist but are fairly overstated
by researchers. Second we managed to explore deeper this first insight by decomposing overall
budget in its sub-components and by assessing how country characteristics may affect the oc-
currence of PbCs. We offer now to turn to other potential sources of the estimate heterogeneity
found in the literature in a more exhaustive manner. To do so we conduct a multiple MRA in
two parts. The first part focuses on the sample and the model specification whereas the second
part deals with the characteristics of the source paper, the methodology used and the choice
of the covariates included in the model. It is not an easy task to know what exactly reflects
each source of heterogeneity. However, we believe that result searching and selection bias are
even more likely to be be captured by the second part of the multiple MRA. That is, when
seeking specific results, authors are likely play on leverages such as the choice of the econometric
estimator or the list of covariates for instance. As a consequence, we think the first part offers
information of what factors may affect the manipulation of leaders, whereas the second part re-
flects rather the ways how the researchers may manipulate their results. Nonetheless, the border
between the two kinds of manipulation is blurred. For each source of heterogeneity we examine,
that is each covariate of our multiple MRA, both explanations are plausible and compatible.
Then we do not pretend our classification allows us to disentangle precisely the effect from each
kind of manipulation. Consequently, we remain cautious in our interpretation. Given that the
choice of decomposing the multiple analysis in two parts, that through two distinct tables, is
questionable, we finally gather all of the covariates studied in the multiple analysis and assess the
strength of their role in explaining heterogeneity of estimates found in the literature through a
bayesian MRA. Such a method removes any arbitrariness in the choice of covariates and reveals
us which should be included in the “true” model explaining the estimates of pre-electoral budget
manipulation.
9.1. Data and model specification
We run the multivariate MRA model described by equation (3). This model allows to observe
the causes of heterogeneous findings on PbC in the empirical literature. In particular, this section
intends to improve our understanding of what determinants related to the sample and model
specification condition the existence and magnitude of PbC.
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The first four columns of Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the whole sample with
the use of the adjusted partial correlation. All the columns but column 2 report the general
model with all moderators, following seminal literature on meta-analysis in economics (Askarov
and Doucouliagos, 2013; Costa-Font et al., 2014; de Linde Leonard et al., 2014, among others),
estimated with WLS weighted by precision and clustered by studies.
Column 3 control for authors’ fixed effects with the FEML estimator. As the number of
clusters relative to the number of MRA moderators is small (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2013),
we use the FEML estimator by double clustering standard errors on studies and fiscal output, in
column 4.24 In contrast, column 2 employs the general-to-specific methodology, whereby MRA
explanatory variables which are not significant at 10% level in column 1 are removed from the
estimation in order to have a parsimonious model (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). As FEML
estimator is considered as the most exhaustive, it’s our benchmark when interpreting results.
Table 5 reveals a significant selection bias that disappears when controlling for authors’
fixed effects. This encourages us to explore further sources of strategic manipulations for re-
searchers.25. It is also worthy to note that the constant, reflecting the genuine effect of elections
on budget variations, is several times stronger than the value found in the simple MRA. The
coefficient is now above 0.10, that is a medium effect according to Cohen (1988) and a small
impact according to Doucouliagos (2011).
Additionally, we do not find strong effects of sample choice. Results simply suggest PbCs
are less severe during the 1990’s than during the decades 1960 and 1970. The difference is
statistically significant and not economically not negligible.26 Concerning spatial differences, we
only notice that Western countries and Japan are less affected by pre-electoral cycles. This result
is line with the idea that in older and stronger democracies PbCs are less strong. However, the
evidence is not strongly robust.
We then investigates if the model specification affects the strength of PbCs. In particular
we focus on how selecting a subsample may matter. Interestingly, we notice that subsamples on
established democracies exhibit significantly reduced PbCs, and results are strongly robust to
the introduction of authors’ dummies. In line with Table 3 and seminal work of Brender and
24There are 23 distinct measures of fiscal outputs are reported in the 58 studies included in our analysis.
25See Section 9.2
26It could reflect the incorporation of theories on hysteresis of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986)
and time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) to economic policy implications
in the 1990’s. It’s result could also driven by a couple papers reporting weak evidence of budget manipulation.
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Drazen (2005), we have suggesting evidences that informed and experienced voters reduce the
budget manipulation, due to democratic maturity.
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Table 5: Multiple FAT-PET models [Data and model specification]
Variables
All observations
Adjusted partial correlation
General Specific FEML FEML
double cluster
Publication bias
Standard error
0.898** 0.884*** 0.323 0.323
(0.389) (0.265) (0.523) (0.407)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.006 0.012 0.012*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Subsample
-0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
ConstitSamp
-0.027* -0.020* 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
HighincSamp
-0.011 -0.008 -0.008
(0.021) (0.016) (0.013)
EstdemocSamp
-0.028*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
HighdemocSamp
-0.005 -0.014 -0.014*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
BadSamp 0.009 -0.001 -0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Time and region
1980s 0.013 0.021 0.021
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025)
1990s
-0.092*** -0.099*** -0.052 -0.052*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.028)
Recent
0.005 0.012* 0.012
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
Eeca
0.015 -0.010 -0.010
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Lac
0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013)
Mena
-0.001 -0.009 -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sap
0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Ssa
-0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
WeJ
0.001 -0.015 -0.015*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Global
-0.010 0.004 0.004
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012)
Constant 0.106** 0.121*** - -
(0.052) (0.035) - -
RMSE 0.053 0.054 0.048 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.098 0.567 0.567
Number of cluster 57 57 57 147
Number of covariates 19 5 18 18
Authors fixed effect No No Yes Yes
N 1,331 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: See Table 1. Estimation using WLS, with precision squared weights. Columns 3 and 4 includes authors fixed effects (not reported).
Standard errors clustered by studies in parenthesis. Double clustering on studies and fiscal output in column 4. Adjusted R2 is not strictly
comparable across the different models. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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9.2. Paper, methodology and covariates
The MRA reported in Table 6 incorporates several key variables related to publication itself,
the methodology and the list of covariates retained by authors to explain the heterogeneity of the
results. Once again, the publication bias disappears when augmenting the model with author
dummies. We then look if the characteristics of papers play a role. A first hypothesis we test
is if published papers report greater PbCs. Journals may be more prone to select significant
over zero-effect results. The coefficient associated to the variable “Unpublished” suggests this is
not the case. Second, the quality of the paper imperfectly proxied through the impact factor of
the review or series in which the paper is published, does not affect the level of manipulation
neither. We also focus on a specific journal whose political cycles are one of the main topic,
namely Public Choice journal. Despite editorial boarding focused on decision-makers’ strategic
behavior, the journal does not seem to publish disproportionately PbC-friendly articles. Last
but not least, we have suggesting evidences of the decreasing trend in PbC, by taking into
account the publication timing (see columns 3-4). As the “Before2008 ” coefficient is significant
when controlling for authors’ fixed effect it could imply a genuine decline in PbC, which may
be hidden by researchers. In line with structural break of Figure 1, it could also capture the
massive fiscal stimulus, in response to the global recession of 2008-2009 (Lee et al., 2009).
A second block of covariates focuses on the methodology employed by authors. More pre-
cisely we look at the measure of the election and budget output selected, and of the estimator
selected. First, behavior on electoral manipulation does not differ when the dependent variable
refers alternatively to fiscal surpluses, revenues or spending gross categories, as YSurplus coeffi-
cient underlines (columns 1-4). So, PbC magnitude is related to the nature of fiscal output and
to its adjustments.27 Indeed, strategic manipulation is found to be significantly reinforced when
using data from central government, once taken into account author’s unobservable heterogene-
ity (columns 3 and 4). Adjustments on electoral calendar, executive elections and predetermined
elections can be a serious issue in the PbC literature. Among adjustments on elections, relying
only on predetermined election, is associated with less magnitude in PbC. Econometric method-
ology makes a difference. Using dynamic panel estimator leads to more severe PbCs (columns
1 and 2). One possible explanation is the use and abuse of GMM estimators to find convincing
insights on PbCs. We may even consider that this insight finds support in the fact that this effect
27See Section 3
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disappears once we control for authors’ fixed effect. Conversely, correction of standard errors
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation contributes to decrease magnitude of PbCs (columns
1-4). That is, using more requiring estimators leads to smaller PbCs. Finally, the last block of
Table 6 shows that the choice of the list of covariates is not neutral and may affect the strength
of PbCs authors report. Hence, when determining the way they measure their interest variables,
which control variables they include in their econometric model and which tools they use to
estimate it, authors may increase their expectancy to obtain specific and significant results in
order their theoretical assumptions or ideology to be validated.28
28As we found suggesting evidence of the damping impact of established democracies on PbCs, we select
covariates from Brender and Drazen (2005), but also taking into account for the introduction, or not, of partisan
cycles.
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Table 6: Multiple FAT-PET models [Paper, methodology and covariates]
Variables
All observations
Adjusted partial correlation
General Specific FEML FEML
double cluster
Publication bias
Standard error
0.954*** 0.643*** 0.187 0.187
(0.254) (0.239) (0.466) (0.404)
Paper
Public Choice 0.010 -0.021 -0.021
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
Unpublished
0.004 -0.100 -0.100
(0.011) (0.095) (0.092)
Impact factor
0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Before 2008 -0.013 -0.083*** -0.083***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020)
Methodology
Samplesize 0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Infrannual
-0.002 -0.011 -0.011
(0.011) (0.008) (0.024)
YSurplus
0.015 0.010 0.010
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
YVar
-0.013 0.002 0.002
(0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
YCycl
-0.036* -0.034*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.018)
YCentral
-0.008 0.071*** 0.071***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
ElectDum
0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
ElectRat
-0.010 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
ACalendar
0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
AHighest
0.007 0.128 0.128
(0.011) (0.119) (0.116)
AExog
-0.016** -0.018*** -0.012 -0.012*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
EconDynamic
0.017*** 0.014** 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
SE Correction -0.014* -0.004 -0.011*** -0.011**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.012 -0.014 -0.014
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Trade
-0.003 0.010 0.010
(0.020) (0.027) (0.019)
PopStruct
0.001 0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.015) (0.012)
OG
-0.005 -0.022* -0.022**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
Partisan
0.037* 0.031** -0.014 -0.014
(0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Time
0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant -0.005 0.024** - -
(0.026) (0.010) - -
RMSE 0.053 0.054 0.048 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.073 0.561 0.561
Number of cluster 57 57 57 147
Number of covariates 25 7 24 24
Authors fixed effect No No Yes Yes
N 1,331 1,331 1,331 1,331
Notes: See Table 5.
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9.3. Bayesian meta-analysis
Lastly, we provide a bayesian MRA. It presents advantages in two respects. First, it offers
another rigorous and agnostic approach to determine which factors affect the heterogeneity of
the results found in the literature and quantify these effects. Second, as we realize the multiple
MRA in two stages, we believe putting together all the covariates examined in Tables 5 and 6
allows to reassess the effect of each covariate without imposing any predetermined structure to
our model of estimation.
We condider the uniform prior on model probabilities together with a UIP g-prior, as
Havra´nek (2015).29 All results are display in Figure 7 and Table 7. We retain all covariates
with a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) over 50%, in the frequentist check OLS. Our find-
ings relative to the established democracies and 1990’s damping effect, but also to the non
neutrality of empirical methodology and covariates inclusion, are corroborates. They are still
robust to alternative priors (see Figure 8 and Table 8) and use of precision squared as weights
(see Figure 9 and Table 9).
29We use the BMS package of Stefan Zeugner. We consider a chain of 200 million recorded draws with 100
million burn-ins, by applying the birth-death sampler. 48, 667731 models are visited and the best 5000 models
have a cumulative probability of 54%. Additional details are available upon request.
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Table 7: BMA [UIP g-prior; uniform model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: uniform Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Publication bias
SE 1.000 0.961 0.116 1.000 0.748*** (0.268) 0.748*** (0.242)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.697
Subsample 0.072 0.001 0.003 1.000
ConstitSamp 1.000 -0.034 0.008 0.000 -0.020* (0.012) -0.020 (0.013)
HighincSamp 0.431 -0.012 0.016 0.000
EstdemocSamp 0.995 -0.043 0.010 0.000 -0.037*** (0.006) -0.037*** (0.010)
HighdemocSamp 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.085
BadSamp 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.025
Time and region
1980s 0.087 0.002 0.007 0.966
1990s 0.866 -0.042 0.022 0.000 -0.084*** (0.026) -0.084*** (0.021)
Recent 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.270
Eeca 0.242 0.004 0.009 1.000
Lac 0.028 0.000 0.003 0.929
Mena 0.104 -0.002 0.006 0.000
Sap 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.751
Ssa 0.481 -0.015 0.018 0.000
WeJ 0.085 -0.001 0.005 0.000
Global 0.617 -0.016 0.015 0.000 -0.010 (0.006) -0.010 (0.010)
Paper
Public Choice 0.997 0.032 0.008 1.000 0.017 (0.011) 0.017 (0.016)
Unpublished 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.989
Impact factor 0.128 0.000 0.000 1.000
Before 2008 0.129 -0.002 0.007 0.000
Methodology
Samplesize 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.436
Infrannual 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.260
YSurplus 0.533 0.007 0.007 1.000 0.013 (0.010) 0.013 (0.009)
YVar 0.983 -0.039 0.012 0.000 -0.012 (0.012) -0.012 (0.013)
YCycl 1.000 -0.065 0.012 0.000 -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031** (0.015)
YCentral 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.978
ElectDum 0.828 0.017 0.010 1.000 0.009 (0.008) 0.009 (0.007)
ElectRat 0.076 -0.001 0.005 0.035
ACalendar 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.990
AHighest 0.108 0.001 0.004 1.000
AExog 0.115 -0.002 0.005 0.000
EconDynamic 0.795 0.015 0.009 1.000 0.010* (0.005) 0.010** (0.005)
Se Correction 0.808 -0.015 0.009 0.000 -0.007 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006)
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.036 0.000 0.003 0.999
Trade 0.076 -0.001 0.003 0.000
PopStruct 0.043 0.000 0.002 0.003
OG 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.018
Partisan 0.998 0.039 0.009 1.000 0.022* (0.012) 0.022* (0.011)
Time 0.081 0.001 0.004 1.000
Constant 1.000 0.070 NA NA 0.106*** (0.034) 0.106*** (0.029)
RMSE - 0.052 0.052
Adjusted R2 - 0.135 0.135
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster - 57 147
N 1.331 1.331 1.331
Notes: Dependent variable: adjusted partial correlation. Birth-death sampler used. Post.mean: posterior mean conditional on inclusion.
Post.s.d.: posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion. Cond.pos.sign: probability of positive sign conditional on inclusion. In the
Frequentist check we only include explanatory variables with PIP > 0.500. The standard errors in the Frequentist check are clustered on
studies, or double clustered on studies and fiscal output.
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Table 8: BMA [BRIC g-prior; beta-binomial model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: beta-binomial Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Publication bias
SE 1.000 1.021 0.113 1.000 0.848*** (0.235) 0.848*** (0.234)
Model structure
Interactive model 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.874
Subsample 0.031 0.000 0.002 1.000
ConstitSamp 0.974 -0.029 0.009 0.000 -0.017 (0.011) -0.017 (0.014)
HighincSamp 0.111 -0.003 0.009 0.000
EstdemocSamp 1.000 -0.045 0.009 0.000 -0.037*** (0.007) -0.037*** (0.010)
HighdemocSamp 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.087
BadSamp 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.002
Time and region
1980s 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.688
1990s 0.886 -0.045 0.021 0.000 -0.083*** (0.023) -0.083*** (0.020)
Recent 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.492
Eeca 0.077 0.001 0.005 0.992
Lac 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.966
Mena 0.084 -0.001 0.005 0.001
Sap 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.175
Ssa 0.155 -0.004 0.010 0.000
WeJ 0.041 -0.001 0.003 0.000
Global 0.454 -0.010 0.013 0.000
Paper
Public Choice 0.987 0.031 0.009 1.000 0.016 (0.013) 0.016 (0.018)
Unpublished 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.948
Impact factor 0.023 0.000 0.000 1.000
Before 2008 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.000
Methodology
Samplesize 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.361
Infrannual 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.230
YSurplus 0.176 0.002 0.005 1.000
YVar 0.992 -0.042 0.010 0.000 -0.013 (0.012) -0.013 (0.013)
YCycl 1.000 -0.062 0.012 0.000 -0.023*** (0.008) -0.023 (0.015)
YCentral 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.999
ElectDum 0.764 0.017 0.011 1.000 0.012 (0.007) 0.012* (0.007)
ElectRat 0.080 -0.002 0.006 0.008
ACalendar 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.932
AHighest 0.022 0.000 0.002 1.000
AExog 0.177 -0.003 0.007 0.000
EconDynamic 0.225 0.004 0.008 1.000
Se Correction 0.221 -0.004 0.008 0.000
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.018 0.000 0.002 1.000
Trade 0.036 0.000 0.002 0.000
PopStruct 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.005
OG 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.014
Partisan 0.998 0.042 0.009 1.000 0.028** (0.012) 0.028** (0.012)
Time 0.016 0.000 0.001 1.000
Constant 1.000 0.062 NA NA 0.095*** (0.027) 0.095*** (0.025)
RMSE 0.053 0.053
Adjusted R2 0.1119 0.1119
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster 57 147
N 1.331 1.331 1.331
Notes: See Table 7.
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Table 9: Weighted BMA [UIP g-prior; uniform model prior]
BMA Frequentist check (OLS)
Model prior: uniform Cluster: study Double cluster
PIP Post.mean Post.s.d. Cond.pos.sign Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Model structure
Interactive model 0.139 0.001 0.004 1.000
Subsample 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.530
ConstitSamp 0.528 -0.010 0.011 0.000 0.007 (0.010) 0.007 (0.013)
HighincSamp 0.340 -0.006 0.010 0.004
EstdemocSamp 0.847 -0.020 0.011 0.000 -0.027*** (0.007) -0.027*** (0.010)
HighdemocSamp 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.000
BadSamp 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.971
Time and region
1980s 0.384 0.009 0.012 0.997
1990s 0.641 -0.019 0.017 0.000 -0.122*** (0.025) -0.122*** (0.020)
Recent 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.956
Eeca 0.897 0.019 0.010 1.000
Lac 0.365 0.007 0.010 0.996
Mena 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.394
Sap 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.383
Ssa 0.630 -0.014 0.012 0.000 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
WeJ 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.129
Global 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.025
Paper
Public Choice 0.990 0.021 0.006 1.000 0.022* (0.013) 0.022 (0.017)
Unpublished 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.832
Impact factor 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.881
Before 2008 0.044 0.000 0.002 0.003
Methodology
Samplesize 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.088
Infrannual 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.239
YSurplus 0.999 0.013 0.003 1.000 0.011 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010)
YVar 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.006
YCycl 0.154 -0.004 0.010 0.000
YCentral 0.236 -0.003 0.006 0.001
ElectDum 0.208 0.002 0.005 1.000
ElectRat 0.133 -0.002 0.006 0.000
ACalendar 0.010 0.000 0.000 1.000
AHighest 0.809 0.013 0.008 1.000 0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009)
AExog 0.820 -0.015 0.009 0.000 -0.008 (0.007) -0.008 (0.012)
EconDynamic 0.446 0.005 0.007 1.000
Se Correction 0.157 -0.002 0.004 0.003
Covariates
GDPpc. 0.339 0.005 0.008 1.000
Trade 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.266
PopStruct 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.783
OG 0.030 0.000 0.001 0.021
Partisan 1.000 0.037 0.007 1.000 0.030** (0.014) 0.030** (0.013)
Time 0.060 0.000 0.002 0.998
Constant 1.000 1.004 NA NA 0.156*** (0.025) 0.156*** (0.021)
RMSE 0.054 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.085
Number of studies 57 57 57
Number of cluster 57 147
N 1.331 1.331 1.331
Notes: Precision squared weights. See Table 7.
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10. Conclusion
Initiated by Nordhaus (1975), the PbC literature is still flourishing as empirical findings are
not unanimous on the existence and magnitude of such cycles. A couple of narrative reviews
help to understand how the literature is structured and what are the main conditions affecting
the strategic manipulation of budget by political leaders in pre-electoral period. We go one
step further by offering a statistical and systematic analysis of all PbC-related academic papers
with the intention to identify the main sources of variability observed in the literature and
obtain robust and reliable statistical information on the genuine effects of election on fiscal
tools’ distortion.
We conduct our analysis on the 1,331 estimates of PbC collected from 58 cross-country
studies. The MRA reveals a significant selection bias from scholars translating an inclination to
exaggerate the magnitude of PbC. However, once controlled for this overestimation, we still find
a slight but statistically robust proof of manipulation of budget by leaders. If necessary, this
confirms the opportunistic nature of leaders and the need to strengthen political and economic
institutions in order to increase accountability and get closer to the ideal of democracy.
Interestingly, we show that the deterioration of primary balance before elections is systematic,
but evidence of public revenues and spending manipulation are slightly less robust. We attribute
this finding to leaders adopting a rather revenues or spending-led according to the political
costs-benefits trade-off they face. By disaggregating public spending, we find that leaders are
more prone to manipulate some subcomponents, such as increasing current relative to capital
expenditures but also broad public goods in pre-electoral period, consistently with the theory.
On the other hand, incumbents do not systematically target specific revenues subcomponents
when they adopt a tax cut strategy in order to maximize their reelection prospects.
In addition, concluding that bias from research in this literature is far greater than the manip-
ulation of budget by leaders, we realize a sensitivity analysis assessing how model specifications
and methodological choices adopted by authors may affect PbC estimates. Finally, the evidence
of strategic manipulation we observe on fiscal aggregate levels is very likely to be magnified by
composition manipulation (Rogoff, 1990; Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002; Brender and Drazen,
2013). Once again, this impels scientists to carry on with research on political cycles and the
way to limit them in order to make democracy more effective.
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Appendix A. List of studies and descriptive statistics
Table A.10: List of studies
Author(s) Author(s) Author(s)
1 Afonso (2008) 21 Galeotti and Salford (2001) 41 Morozumi et al. (2014)b
2 Alesina et al. (1992) 22 Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) 42 Moura˜o (2011)
3 Alesina et al. (1993) 23 Hagen (2007) 43 Parra and Santiso (2009)
4 Alesina et al. (2006) 24 Hallerberg et al. (2002) 44 Nyblade and O’Mahony (2014)
5 Alt and Lassen (2006) 25 Hanusch (2012) 45 Persson and Tabellini (2003a)
6 Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) 26 Hanusch and Vaaler (2013) 46 Potrafke (2007)
7 Barberia and Avelino (2011) 27 Hanusch and Keefer (2014) 47 Potrafke (2010)
8 Bayar and Smeets (2009) 28 Jong-A-Pin et al. (2012) 48 Schuknecht (1996)
9 Block (2002) 29 Kaplan and Thomsson (2014) 49 Schuknecht (2000)
10 Block et al. (2003) 30 Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) 50 Shelton (2014)
11 Bove et al. (2014) 31 Klasˇnja (2008) 51 Shi and Svensson (2006)
12 Brender and Drazen (2005) 32 Klomp and de Haan (2013a) 52 Stanova (2009)
13 Buti and Van Den Noord (2004) 33 Klomp and de Haan (2013b) 53 Streb et al. (2009)
14 Combes et al. (2015)a 34 Klomp and de Haan (2013c) 54 Streb et al. (2012)
15 Costa-Fernandes and Mota (2013) 35 Klomp and de Haan (2013d) 55 Troeger and Schneider (2012)
16 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 36 Kouvavas (2013) 56 Tujula and Wolswijk (2007)
17 Ebeke and O¨lc¸er (2013) 37 Kraemer (1997) 57 Wright (2011)
18 Efthyvoulou (2012) 38 Maurel (2006)
19 Ehrhart (2013) 39 Mink and de Haan (2006)
20 Franzese Jr. (2000) 40 Mosley and Chiripanhura (2012)
Notes: a: As the publication date is after december 31th 2014, we take into account the working paper version (Combes et al., 2013). b: We
don’t consider regressions from Table 2 to Table 5 in Morozumi et al. (2014) due to lack of information on effective reference category for
elections.
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Appendix B. Variable definitions
Table B.13: Variable definitions
No. Variables Variable description (BD for binary dummy) N Mean S.d. Min. Max.
1 Adjustedpartial Partial correlation (adjusted for revenues and fiscal surplus). 1,331 0.06 0.09 -0.29 0.65
2 Partial Partial correlation (non adjusted for revenues and fiscal surplus). 1,331 -0.01 0.11 -0.65 0.62
3 SE Standard error of the partial correlation. 1,331 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.26
Group 1 : Measures of cycle
4 YSur BD if used fiscal surplus (or inverse of deficit) over GDP. 1,726 0.35 0.48 0 1
5 YSpen BD if used total expenditure over GDP. 1,726 0.19 0.39 0 1
6 YRev BD if used total revenues over GDP. 1,726 0.14 0.35 0 1
7 YSpen bis BD if used total (or subcomponents) expenditure over GDP, in level, or per capita. 1,726 0.40 0.49 0 1
8 YRev bis BD if used total (or subcomponents) revenues over GDP. 1,726 0.25 0.44 0 1
9 YVar BD if dependent variable is in first difference or growth rate. 1,726 0.13 0.34 0 1
10 YCycl BD if dependent variable is cyclically adjusted. 1,726 0.06 0.23 0 1
11 YCentral BD if dependent variable explicitely refers to central government. 1,726 0.59 0.49 0 1
Group 2: Measure of elections
12 ElectDum BD if elections are captured by electoral dummies. 1,726 0.77 0.42 0 1
13 ElectRat BD if Elections are captured by ratio a la Franzese. 1,726 0.19 0.39 0 1
14 ElectOth BD if Elections are captured by other methods (used as the base). 1,726 0.04 0.20 0 1
Group 3: Adjustment on elections
15 ACalendar BD if adjustment for electoral or fiscal calendar. 1,726 0.18 0.39 0 1
16 AHighest BD if adjustment on executive election. 1,726 0.50 0.50 0 1
17 AExog BD if adjustment on predetermined election. 1,726 0.33 0.47 0 1
Group 4: Other methodology
18 Samplesize Number of observations included in the sample. 1,726 719.20 779.59 15 6631
19 Infra BD if infra annual data used. 1,726 0.05 0.22 0 1
20 EconDynamic BD if used dynamic panel estimator. 1,726 0.33 0.47 0 1
21 EconOther BD if used other estimator (used as the base). 1,726 0.67 0.47 0 1
22 SE correction BD if used SE correction for heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. 1,726 0.50 0.50 0 1
Group 5: Model structure
23 Interactive BD if author(s) use interactive models. 1,726 0.38 0.48 0 1
24 Subsample BD if author(s) use subsample technique. 1,726 0.48 0.50 0 1
25 ConstitSamp BD if subsample on specific constitutional forms. 1,726 0.26 0.44 0 1
26 HighincSamp BD if subsample on high-income countries. 1,726 0.24 0.43 0 1
27 EstdemocSamp BD if subsample on established democracies. 1,726 0.17 0.37 0 1
28 HighdemocSamp BD if subsample on high level democracies. 1,726 0.03 0.16 0 1
29 BadSamp BD if subsample on other bad-case senarii for PbC. 1,726 0.05 0.22 0 1
Group 6: Decades
30 Elder BD if data for the 50’s, 60’s or 70’s (used as the base). 1,726 0.63 0.48 0 1
31 1980s BD if data for the 80’s. 1,726 0.79 0.41 0 1
32 1990s BD if data for the 90’s. 1,726 0.97 0.18 0 1
33 Recent BD if data for the 00’s and 10’s. 1,726 0.86 0.35 0 1
Group 7: Region
34 WeJ BD if Western Europe, neo Europes & (or) Japan were included in samples. 1,726 0.73 0.44 0 1
35 Eeac BD if countries from Eastern Europe & Central Asia were included in samples. 1,726 0.55 0.50 0 1
36 Lac BD if countries from Latin America & Caribbean were included in samples. 1,726 0.62 0.49 0 1
37 Mena BD if countries from Middle-east & North Africa were included in samples. 1,726 0.49 0.50 0 1
38 Sap BD if countries from South Asia & Pacific were included in samples (except Japan). 1,726 0.51 0.50 0 1
39 Ssa BD if countries from Sub-saharan Africa were included in samples. 1,726 0.49 0.50 0 1
40 Global BD if at least two regions were included in samples. 1,726 0.62 0.48 0 1
Group 8: Publications outlet
41 Public Choice BD if article is published on Public Choice. 1,726 0.11 0.32 0 1
42 Unpublished BD for unpublished paper. 1,726 0.49 0.50 0 1
43 Impact factor Google Scholar (5 years) impact factor of publication. 1,726 25.92 27.20 0 168
44 Before2008 BD if paper is released ≤ 2008. 1,726 0.28 0.45 0 1
45 After2008 BD if paper is released > 2008 (used as the base). 1,726 0.72 0.45 0 1
Group 9: Covariates
46 GDPpc. BD for per capita GDP as control. 1,726 0.76 0.43 0 1
47 Trade BD for trade as control. 1,726 0.57 0.50 0 1
48 PopStruct BD for population structure as control. 1,726 0.61 0.49 0 1
49 OG BD for output gap as control. 1,726 0.51 0.50 0 1
50 Partisan BD for partisan measure (such as political ideology) as control. 1,726 0.13 0.33 0 1
51 Time BD for time dummies or time trend as control. 1,726 0.56 0.50 0 1
Notes: a: We include the discretionary measures of Buti and Van Den Noord (2004) in that category.
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